Engaging democratically elected assemblies in national decision-making over the extraterritorial use of force seemingly provides a secure check on executive abuses of power.
Introduction
One of the more striking features of the ongoing crises in Libya, Syria and Iraq, is that the resultant use-of-force debates have not been confined to foreign ministries or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but have spilled over into many domestic assemblies.
Executive-led justifications of proposed uses of force based upon accounts of national interest and international law might have triggered these debates, but they have been shaped by the legacy of the "new-world-order" humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and the post-9/11 invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Our article evaluates whether this turn towards, and even extension of, domestic use-of-force arrangements is aimed at circumventing inconvenient UN thought not to affect these actions' compliance with international law. 5 In this article we treat the United Kingdom (UK) as our primary case study of state efforts to use domestic authorisation to side-step the Charter's strictures. The UK's permanent UNSC membership, its shifting domestic use-of-force arrangements and its invocation of novel legal bases for action combine to make its state practice worthy of particular study.
In 
Legality and Legitimacy in the Use of Force
Given humanitarian intervention's scant grounding in international law 15 commentators have exposed how, during NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention, participating states began to cast the doctrine as legitimate, rather than legal. The shift in language was not subtle. At the height of NATO's airstrikes Tony Blair declared that this was 'a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values'. 16 A month later the UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, dismissed questions over the legality of using force as a distraction from 'the evil that we are 14 As such, humanitarian intervention could amount to little more than an 'antiseptic version of imperialism'; B.R. Barber, 'Constitutional Faith' in M.C. Nussbaum (ed), between these factors can shift depending upon whether a government is seeking to persuade international institutions or a domestic audience that a proposed military action is legitimate.
The concept of legitimacy can therefore be grounded in 'particular values and on unilateral or partial appreciations' of an action, 20 providing a level of indeterminacy which can be exploited when militarily powerful countries seek to evade international law's restrictions upon military force.
Nonetheless, Anthea Roberts suggests that a binary account of the relationship between legality and legitimacy is unhelpful; 'one of the functions of law is to help delimit legitimate actions from illegitimate actions and thus help guide behaviour'. 21 When we speak of "legalised" legitimacy, derived in part from a rules-based assessment of the validity of actions, political legitimacy, derived from the democratic accountability of the actors involved in a decision, and moral legitimacy, derived from the values-based arguments for intervention (such as the desirability of assisting allies or alleviating a humanitarian crisis), these facets of "rightful" international conduct are not demarked by fixed boundaries. 22 Even in the context of the Kosovo intervention, the Blair Government might have wrapped the UK's involvement in the rhetoric of legitimacy, but it also advanced response to a humanitarian catastrophe as a legal basis for action. 23 The subsequent machinations surrounding UNSC Resolution 1441 24 as a legal basis for the Iraq War in 2003, 25 show the continuing importance of building a legal (and not simply political or moral) case for UK military action.
When the UK has sought to use force outwith a clear basis under the Charter these examples indicate that the Government has placed a premium on constructing plausible "legalised" grounds for action. Inconvenient international law strictures needed to be weakened as a corollary of these efforts. Throughout his time in office Tony Blair maintained that a 'reconsideration' 26 of the UNSC's role was necessary and warned that he could not contemplate the escalation of perceived threats to peace and security when 'the UNbecause of a political disagreement in its Councils -is paralysed'. 27 International law, as it so the case within the UK's dualist legal order, was presented as more malleable than domestic law, no matter how firmly established the specific rules on the use of force. 31 generated by the return of UK-resident ISIS fighters, and the need to protect refugees and minority communities. 32 In the event, only a deployment in Iraq, which had requested assistance, was subject to a vote, but through such claims the Government was attempting to establish a legalised basis for a more extensive action should the issue be revisited. Although UNSC inaction has overshadowed many of these parliamentary debates, even when it has acted, as in the case of Resolution 2249 (albeit not under Chapter VII) on the threat to international peace and security posed by ISIS, 33 the UK Government has maintained its freedom of action with regard to this precedent by declaring that this 'resolution is not necessary … to justify action'. 34 By contrast, with regard to action against ISIS in Syria, the Prime Minister has characterised the Commons' support for UK action as being so significant that he would not hold a vote 'if there is a danger of losing it'. 35 These examples showcase the UK Government attempting to generate legitimacy for an action through superficially plausible, even if far from orthodox, legal explanations of the use of force. If the Commons accepts these claims, and authorises such an action, a necessary degree of domestic political legitimacy will attach to an action.
When Parliament is swayed by legalised language, it generates a precedent which makes support for future actions easier to secure. As with executive practice, domestic assemblies can contribute to the state-practice basis for customary international law. 36 In theory, therefore, a legislature's acceptance of non-Charter-based justifications for military force could contribute to the legality of such an action. When a legislature has been democratically-elected, its authorisation of a use of force poses a challenge to the basis of international institutions' authority. 37 As such, "democratic" authorisation can be used to silence or marginalise '"peace through law" enthusiasts'. 38 In the post-9/11 era, the Bush converse of this process is readily identifiable; international institutional activity regularly impacts upon the domestic legitimacy of conflict decisions. Resolution 1973 authorising the 2011 intervention in Libya 40 played an important role in legitimating the US engagement even in the absence of specific congressional approval for the deployment. 41 In the UK, David Cameron similarly harnessed 'the legitimising power of the Security Council to win ...
parliamentary support'. 42 In contrast to democratically-elected domestic assemblies, UN mechanisms are susceptible to critique on the basis of their so-called democratic deficit. 43 Claims that domestic assembly authorisation can enhance the international legal legitimacy of an intervention are therefore difficult for the UNSC to resist, but create obvious dangers. A short debate ensued in which the leaders of the major parties assented. 132 That a vote was not needed speaks to the inevitability of the outcome. 133 To this day Grey's speech remains dogged by controversy, with his critics arguing that Parliament committed the UK to war on the basis of a partial rendering of the events precipitating the conflict. facto, exercises of the war prerogative and gave tacit approval to twentieth-century military interventions. 138 Its involvement was intended to scrutinise and ultimately legitimate UK policy, to inform the general public and also to prevent the accumulation of societal tensions by airing different viewpoints on the decision to use force. 139 Often these arrangements meant that the Commons would find itself presented with a "done deal" by ministers; 140 circumstances it would be internationally humiliating for MPs to question the Government's policy. 141 161 and the summary of the Attorney General's legal advice provided to Parliament were seriously deficient. 162 In the final assessment a parliamentary authorisation of a use of force remains a political assessment drawing upon national interest and moral considerations as well as issues of lawfulness. MPs might therefore accept (as some arguably did in the context of Iraq) an action as legitimate notwithstanding a breach of international law. 163 Exploiting these advantages, the Blair Government harnessed the legitimating force of Parliament's vote on the use of force to draw attention away from the lack of a clear basis for military action under international law.
The External Dimension: Sidestepping the UNSC

Combining the Internal and External Approaches
The to follow the constitutional convention that they had invoked two years earlier. 185 For the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, these actions meant that outside exceptional emergency circumstances Parliament must express its opinion on a use of force prior to the UK's involvement. 186 Carsten Stahn has therefore argued that the 'greater involvement of parliamentary control over executive action may be one of the "gains" of the Syrian crises. 187 bound together with deliberation upon an action's morality and whether 'it is a politically or militarily sensible operation'. 188 The latter facets of the decision have come to make the UK Parliament one of the decision-making fora at which a proposed use of force can be rejected, thereby bringing decision-making closer to the influence of domestic constituent actors (UK citizens). At issue, however, is whether such activity can displace the UNSC's role.
In his legal advice, published in summary form to bolster the Government's case for action, the Attorney General Dominic Grieve asserted that '[i]f action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria'. 189 His advice had two limbs. The first was that use of force by the UK is not necessarily predicated upon UNSC authorisation and the second explained the circumstances which would trigger the UK's supposed right to intervene by force in another state for humanitarian purposes. 190 The first limb was predicated upon parliamentary affirmation supplying the necessary democratic authority for an action, thereby displacing the need for UNSC input. 191 The implication of the advice is that such domestic activity can and should impact upon an action's international legality. 192 From being mooted as a potential avenue by which to provide 'extra democratic legitimacy to military action' after the Kosovo intervention, 193 Government endeavoured to win parliamentarians over to humanitarian intervention by playing upon frustrations with UN processes which were, after all, designed to stymie opportunities for a state or group of states to intervene in the affairs of another by force.
Having set out the UK Government's position that the UNSC is, in certain cases, dispensable, Dominic Grieve's advice proceeds to lay down a test for the legal use of force in response to an 'overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe'. 198 He advanced three prerequisites for invoking humanitarian intervention:
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and (iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e.
the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).
These grounds for intervention pay little attention to the relevant international law. 200 Couched in dense legalese, the test purportedly provides a pragmatic formula for interventions, but is unconvincing regarding the necessary evidence-base. The test relies on the UK Government's conclusion that the "international community" accepts that a humanitarian crisis is ongoing and foists the factual assessment upon domestic legislators (regardless of their capacity perform this task). 201 Philippe Sands questions Parliament's ability to conduct such an analysis in the context of the 2013 debate, especially when 'the assertions by the Prime Minister did not appear to be an accurate summary or account of the legal advice received, and in this way had the effect of misleading Parliament'. 202 The notion of "general acceptance" within the international community of circumstances requiring urgent action attempts to discount the opposition of Russia and China to intervention in the UNSC. As such, the only states that matter under this test are liberal-democratic states which accept the possibility of lawful humanitarian intervention. Russell Buchan has suggested that an operative international community might indeed be confined in this way 203 and that some states' opposition to humanitarian intervention could therefore be 'dismissed as illegitimate'. 204 The 2013 chemical weapons crisis highlighted the weaknesses in this proposition. Russia maintained that good-faith negotiations were capable of resolving the specific chemical weapons crisis and was able to use its leverage with the Assad regime to respond to the US and UK position that Syria could address their concerns by verifiable destruction of all such weapons. 205 The subsequent UNSC activity and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons removed this issue as a basis for urgent action. 206 US and UK assertions of a right of humanitarian intervention have been described by Harold Koh as an 'evolution' within international law. 207 Loose talk of evolution, however, avoids discussion of the necessary elements for the alteration of customary international law; state practice and opinio juris. Koh is effectively presenting these states' internal discussions as sufficient to constitute state practice. Although official legal advice can evidence state practice, 208 other states would not ordinarily comment upon it, as they would with state actions, meaning that it should be treated with considerable caution. 209 If there was the need to take urgent action to prevent, for instance, the massacre of a minority community or a Christian community, and Britain could act to prevent that humanitarian catastrophe -if I believed we could effectively act and do that -I am saying I would order that and come straight to the House and explain afterwards. 224 The Prime Minister did not explain the legal basis for such an intervention beyond the vague ned for 'urgent action' in the context of 'humanitarian catastrophe'. The former Attorney
General, however, maintained that the extension to UK operations against ISIS into Syria would be both legal and legitimate notwithstanding the deadlock in the UNSC:
There is no doubt that [the UNSC] has an important role to play in issues concerning humanitarian necessity, but the Government will at least have to consider whether any application, if it were to come, to the UN for such a resolution has any prospect of success. The ability to intervene, I have no doubt, exists, even if no such resolution is present. 225 Dominic Grieve may have been expanding upon a legal position he had set out a year earlier regarding intervention in Syria, but he was joined by parliamentarians who eagerly expressed their opinion that extending the intervention into Syria would be legal on humanitarian intervention grounds. 226 The impact of the successive UK Governments' efforts to build up Parliaments' role and marginalise the UNSC was therefore bearing fruit in terms of parliamentary support, even if such an intervention was in this instance theoretical.
As ISIS continued to gain territory and adherents in spite of the Coalition airstrikes the UK Government would employ the "urgent action" exception within the Young
Convention not in the context of a humanitarian response, but on the basis of defending against threats to 'a critical British national interest'. 227 In early September David Cameron informed Parliament that the UK had indeed used force in Syria, through a drone strike which killed three ISIS members near Raqqa. The Prime Minister characterised the strike as an emergency response to the threat posed by Reyaad Khan, a UK citizen fighting with ISIS, without which 'we had no way of preventing his planned attacks on our country.' 228 The Prime Minister's argument that the drone strike was an imminent necessity to prevent an attack against the UK appears to be an effort to fit the action within Article 51 of the Charter.
Indeed this was the basis on which the UK informed the UNSC of its action though notably these were not the terms by which Parliament was informed. 229 Whether a drone strike can be justified under Article 51 involves not simply a claim as to the extent of this provision of the Charter, but requires the UK to establish the legal and factual basis for this claim. Although the Attorney General maintained that such action is possible in response to a planned armed attack by a terrorist group, 230 the limits of self-defence against a terrorist group under of international law are contested and difficult to fulfil, 231 234 and ministers maintained that 'we will not bring a motion to the House on which there is not some consensus'. 235 There is no doubt that the Government felt bound by the Young Convention, in spite of persistent siren voices that it did not amount to a legal constraint upon action. 236 For all the attention paid to Parliament, however, the UK Government downplayed the significance of the UNSC. The Defence Secretary styled the UK's failure to undertake airstrikes in Syria as 'morally indefensible' alluding to the need to defend UK interests against ISIS. 237 Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee remained unconvinced, maintaining that UNSC authorisation was 'desirable for more than simply legal reasons'. 238 The downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 in October 2015, claimed by ISIS as retaliation for Russia's airstrikes in support of the Assad regime, 239 and the terrorist attacks on Paris two weeks later, which ISIS claimed were a response to French airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, 240 changed the terms of the debate on intervention. As the attribution of these attacks to ISIS was confirmed, the UK Government stepped up its claims that self defence provided a legal basis for extending the UK's strikes against ISIS into Syria:
Of course, it is always preferable in these circumstances to have the full backing of the UN Security Council, but what matters most of all is that any action we would take would be both legal and help protect our country and our people right here. As I said yesterday, we cannot outsource to a Russian veto the decisions we need to keep our country safe. 241 The French Government treated the mass-casualty attacks as an act of war and immediately invoked the European Union's (EU) mutual assistance provision in response to an armed attack. 242 Rather than side-lining the UNSC, however, the French also reworked a Russian Cameron's assertion that as many as 70,000 fighters could be available to seize territory currently held by ISIS was widely disputed as 'absurd', 255 but the Government continued to deflect criticism on the basis that this constituted the independent analysis of the Joint Intelligence Committee. 256 The Prime Minister's insistence in the Commons' Chamber that a vote either way on this issue was 'honourable' 257 could not disguise the efforts by When the afterglow of these actions fade, the systemic weaknesses in parliamentary authorisation may return to limit this constraint on the war prerogative. Moreover, future UK Government ministers looking back at the precedent of the 2015 debate will likely emphasise that the action was justified on the basis of self defence. Once again, UK Government has protected its capacity for future uses of force without UNSC authorisation.
Conclusion
At a time when the UNSC faces sustained criticism as a result of its perceived failure to address threats to international peace and security successive UK Governments have cultivated approaches to the use of force which further marginalise its role. First, they have set out to justify military actions on a myriad of grounds, including legally dubious doctrines such as humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive self defence. These doctrines, invoked on the basis of precedents which are either not applicable to the claims made or which are highly disputed, seek to loosen the Charter's strictures upon the use of force. Second, having used these grounds to shift the focus of use-of-force decision-making away from the UNSC, the Notwithstanding such setbacks, the Government's calculation remains in certain circumstances it will be more likely to succeed in the Commons than in the UNSC.
We do not claim that domestic assemblies ought not to be involved in use of force decisions, and indeed welcome meaningful additional scrutiny of proposed military action.
But a domestic assembly's vote can have no significance in international law or other states will increasingly draw upon the authority of their own domestic assemblies in use of force decisions, even when the character of such assemblies are neither truly deliberative nor democratically-elected. States subject to the proposed use of force, which have a voice within international institutions, are excluded from domestic decision-making processes. Democratic domestic assemblies should therefore be wary of becoming the predominant governance point for authorising military force, on the principled basis that doing so would undermine UN institutions and on the pragmatic basis that legislators are ill-equipped to assess whether a use of force is legitimate under the tests currently in circulation. Relying upon domestic assemblies to provide the sole necessary authorisation point for certain uses of force might appear to offer a means to unblock international institutional processes. This course,
